

Mullā Sadrā's Doctrine of the Trans – substantial Motion

Farah Ramin¹

¹Associate professor, department of philosophy, faculty of theology, Qom University. Email- f.ramin@qom.ac.ir

Received: 08/06/2020

Accepted for Publication: 01/07/2020

Published: 10/07/2020

Abstract

It is beyond doubt that during the last three and half centuries, all intellectual schools of thought in Iran have been influenced by Mullā Sadrā's philosophy. He is considered to be among the Prime Theoretician of Islamic intellectual sciences. One of Sadrā's innovations in philosophy is the doctrine of the trans – substantial motion. The concept of motion lies at the heart of Sadrā's philosophy. The Aristotelian natural motion is substituted by the ontological and trans – substantial motion. In fact, He turns the classical concept of substance into a structure of events, and a process of change. This motion is emanating from the perpetual source of Divine Grace.

Based on the trans – substantial motion, Sadrā proves the existence of God and the resurrection. Moreover, he solves the problem of origination and eternity, the relation of the changing to the permanent, and the problem of the soul and its union with the body. Finally, Mullā Sadrā, by considers the issue of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, attempts to solve the most difficult philosophical problems.

At first, this article presents a summarized background of philosophy in Iran, and explains the theory of the trans – substantial motion. Then, we assert Sadrā's innovations based on this theory.

Keywords: Mullā Sadrā; trans–substantial motion; Aristotelian natural motion; Necessary Being.

Introduction

During the 8th and 9th centuries (H.), the growth of the Eastern Islamic philosophy was very slow. In that era, philosophy was mostly written in theological forms, probably to be protected against the enemies of philosophy and the opponents of intellectual sciences. Although theology (*kalām*), too, was at times, attacked by jurists (*fuqahā*) and despot rulers, theologians (*mutakallimūn*) had introduced themselves as the supporters of religion and were not as notorious as philosophers (Nasr, 1996: 292-294). Among the writers of this period, we may refer to Sa'd al – Din Taftāzani, Mir Sayyid Jurjāni, Mullā 'Alī Qūshchi, and Jalāl al – Din Dawāni.

When shi'ism was recognized as the official religion in Iran during the reign of King Ismā'il Safavid, philosophers could enjoy more liberation, despite the dominance of religious fanaticism and the oppositions of jurists to philosophers. However, in the 11th century, with the appearance of certain philosophers such as Mir Dāmād and Mir Findriski (contemporary with Shaykh Bahā'i and Mir – Dāmād) philosophy was revived.

While Mir Dāmād followed an independent approach through which he synthesized the ideas of the Peripatetics and the Illuminationists, Mir Findriski was more interested in Peripatetic philosophy, especially Ibn Sinā's philosophy, however, the renaissance of philosophy in Iran and the

world of Shi'ism practically took place under the influence of Mullā Sadrā. He developed his philosophy on the basis of the principle of the unity of being (*wahdat al-wujūd*) through combining the basic principles of the Peripatetics and the Illuminationists with the theoretical gnosis (*irfān*) of Ibn-ʿArabi. In this way, he also took into account some of the ideas of the theologians and deliberated upon them. Then, he synthesized the important and rational aspects of these four schools, i.e. the Peripatetic philosophy, Illuminationism, gnosis, and theology, and developed a new philosophy. In doing so, he succeeded to raise the status and value of philosophy in Iran to what it was at the time of Fārābi and Ibn-Sīnā.

Sadrā's most important task was to adapt the principles of Shi'ism to philosophy. He performed this task through the book *Sharḥ uṣūl al-kāfi* in a new and intellectual way. Although some of the philosophers did not approve of this approach and criticized him severely, his innovations, undeniably, influenced the ideas of many Shiite traditionalist and religious jurists.

A special feature of Mullā Sadrā's philosophy is that he synthesized revelation (*wahy*) with intellectual reasoning (*burhān*) and purification of the soul. He also harmonized his ideas with Islamic teachings in a way that he could solve the fundamental problems that the Peripatetic philosophers were faced with concerning the teachings of the Quran. It is emphasized that al-Ghazzālī, too, had severely criticized these philosophers with respect to the same problems.

Sadrā, himself, states: "At first I inquired into the ideas of the Peripatetic, the illuminationists, theologians, and the Sufis. I even deliberated upon the ideas of the sophists and came to the conclusion that none of them alone could solve any problems. Therefore, I devoted myself to spiritual wayfaring for a time until certain secrets that had never been divulged through demonstrative reasoning were gradually revealed to me" (Sadrā, 1990: vol.1, 4).

It is beyond doubt that during the last three and half centuries, all intellectual schools of thought in Iran have been influenced by Mullā Sadrā's philosophy. Along with the other great scholars like Fārābi, Ibn-Sīnā, al-Ghazzālī, Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, Suhrawardī, and Ibn-ʿArabi, Mullā Sadrā is considered to be among the prime theoreticians of Islamic intellectual sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-aqliyyah*) and; although, he is not known widely out of Iran, his status is not lower than that of his predecessors. The fundamental principles of Sadrā's philosophy may be summarized in the following four principles:

1. The principality of existence (*aṣālat al-wujūd*)
2. The unity of the reality of being
3. The gradation of being (*tashkīk al-wujūd*)
4. The trans- substantial motion (*al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah*) and its related principles

The above principles are peculiar to Mullā Sadrā and are considered to be among his innovations and none of them have ever been discussed by other philosophers and Gnostics in a manner similar to that of Sadrā's methodology. Although some of his predecessors have implicitly or explicitly referred to his ideas in their works, inquiry into those ideas and substantiating them rationally and responding to the related objections and suspicions are exclusive to Mullā Sadrā.

1. The Trans-Substantial Motion (*al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah*)

The doctrine of the trans- substantial motion introduced two basic elements to Islamic thought, one is the historicity of being and the other is internal restless despite external peace and quiet.

The material beings are historical, that is, due to their moving nature, they are generating time while having the past under their feet. Time does not play any role here and they are only the restless beings, which drag time behind themselves. The world is not a time-bound entity. Rather, it is time that exists in the world because temporality is similar to identity and the manner of the existence of the material creatures. On the other hand, external peace is a disguise for internal restlessness. Restlessness, motion, and the appearance of new phenomena are principal, whereas peace and stillness are delusive and sinful.

In the doctrine of the trans-substantial, the entire universe is a fundamental motion and this motion is like its existence and identity. In fact, the entire universe is a mobile entity with a single motion and each being and accident is a part of the body of this unitary motion that develops a new “self” and “Identity” at every moment, all particles in the universe are in a permanent state of destruction and contingency. This continual destruction or contingency embraces not only all states of objects but also their entire entity and existence as well.

Sadrā extends this view to the domain of man. In his view, the reality of man is a fluid and gradual reality that after passing the earlier stages of life will reach to the level of abstraction and connection to the Holy Truth. That man’s soul is a temporal being, and that time is an “existential being” and not a gradual attribute is a sublime concept in Mullā Sadrā’s thought. Such an idea is very close to what Heidegger proposes. In *Being and Time*, by clarifying the temporality of man’s existence, Heidegger presents an image of man’s becoming and trans-substantial motion which is pretty close to what we have in Sadrāian Philosophy. However, there are striking differences among their basic philosophical ideas. One of the most important differences is that in Mullā Sadrā’s philosophy, time, like, *wujūd*, is closely associated with Perpetual Creation. The meaning of Perpetual Creation is one of the basic concepts in Islamic thought.

The early Islamic philosophers, like Ibn-Sīnā, followed the Aristotelian natural philosophy (*tabi’iyyat*) accept motion merely in the categories of quantity (*Kam*), quality (*Kayf*), situation (*wad*), and place (*ayn*) and rejected the possibility of motion in the category of substance. (Ibn Sīnā, 1985: 101)

Their main reasoning was that motion requires a subject to move and if the substance of an object is changed during motion; consequently, there will be no subject for motion. Mullā Sadrā considers this problem to be the consequence of the confusion of the principles of existence (*wujūd*) and quiddity (*māhiyyah*). He believes that if motion is not analyzed truly, motion in substance is not only possible, but also indispensable and definite, because if motion in substance is not considered to be necessary, motion in accident (*‘arad*) would not be demonstrable.

Motion is, in fact, nothing but the flux of being, either in itself or in something other than itself. This is just similar to the change of color in a flower. During this change, there is no unchanging color so that we could attribute the change to it. Accordingly, motion in substance does not require an unchanging subject to which we may attribute motion.

In general, motion and constancy are two analytic attributes for the flux and unchanging being, and these attributes do not require an objective subject which is independent of description. Thus, according to experts, motion and constancy are among the analytic accidents which do not need an independent subject. Their existence is, rather, identical with the occurred (*ma’rūd*).

In Mullā Sadrā’s Philosophy, the Aristotelian natural motion is substituted by the ontological and trans-substantial motion emanating from the perpetual source of Divine Grace (Sadrā, 1990: Vol.3, 7), It must be noted that the source of grace does not create motion, but brings about interrelated perpetual forms whose product is motion. This idea does not correspond with Aristotle’s idea either in content or in the relationship among the four causes. All motion, which Aristotle sees in and from nature. Mullā Sadrā sees in *wujūd* and associates it to the Divine Creative Power.

It is the point at which Mullā Sadrā’s philosophy drastically differs from that of Aristotle. Aristotle proposes his theory of motion in the domain of physics and in this way moves towards the metaphysical disparity between palpable and impalpable existence; whereas Mullā Sadrā holds that motion is related to metaphysics and propounds it under one of his philosophical divisions entitled the permanent and changing being. What he means here is the reality of being (*wujūd*), not the concept of being. The distinction between the reality of being and the concept of being is of such great significance that without its understanding one cannot properly understand his metaphysics (Akbarian, 1999: Vol.1, 272-273).

Mullā Sadrā, besides proving motion in substance (*jamhar*) (Sadrā, 1990: Vol.1, 80-89) rationally, emphasizes in his various works, namely, *al-Asfār*, *al-Masha'ir*, *Arshīyah*, and *Asrār āl-ayāt*, (Sadrā, 1990: Vol.3; 110; 1983: 86; 1964: 64; 1961: 14); that he has found out the trans-substantial motion through deliberation upon the Quranic verses and refers to them in several places. He also refers to certain remarks by gnostics such as Ibn-‘Arabi (Sadrā, 1990: Vol.3, 111) for confirming his ideas. Although Mullā Sadrā acknowledges motion in substances under the influence of Ibn ‘Arabi and makes the issue demonstrative, he rejects the notion of the “anew creation of the world in every moment” or *al-labs ba’d al-khal* (dressing after undressing of forms) which is asserted by gnostics. Instead, he proposes the theory of *al-labs ba’d al-labs* (dressing after dressing) (Sabzevari, 1993: Vol.4, 313).

Ibn-‘Arabī believes that renewal and transformation exist in all accidents (*a’arā*) and substances (*jawābir*), and the world is renewed owing to the renewal of ideas whereas there is no unity between the new and the old thing.

Sadrā, however, believes that every moment a form much more perfect than the former one is emanated and the form and matter of an existent become themselves the matter for the new form and this process goes on continuously as if one were to put on one dress on top of another. All creatures in the world are moving vertically towards the world of their immutable archetypes as a result of the trans-substantial motion (Sadrā, 1990: Vol.3, 100-112).

In fact, the trans- substantial motion is not the corruption of one substance and the origination of the other. Rather, the point is that since each material object has not achieved perfect immateriality and at the same time it is endowed with the potency of attaining perfection at any moment, it may take a more perfect substantial form as compared to the previous form. This evolutionary process is continued until the complete perfection is achieved. However, the moving object keeps its unity during the evolutionary process.

2. The Innovations Based on the Trans-Substantial Motion

2.1. Theology and the Demonstration of the Necessary Being (Wājib al-wujūd) Based on the Trans- Substantial Motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah)

Creation is clearly and easily explained under the auspices of the trans- substantial motion. The momentary characteristics of the world reveal its needy nature. A realistic person’s worldview would never be the same as what it was before his acquaintance with the trans-substantial motion. If before this and from a scientific viewpoint, he thought that the most fundamental motion of the material world is the motion of the internal parts of an atom, he now finds out that the deepest mystery of the being (*basti*) is that material existence is nothing but a single motion. If before, he regarded the world to be unchanging and static and time as changing, and the passing of the world as dependent upon time, from now on, he will find the world to be deeply changing, and flowing, not only in its appearances and states but also in its very being and entity. If he looked at the world as an independent entity, now he will consider it as a dependent existent that relies on something other than itself.

This dependence is deeply rooted in him and has spread over his whole existence. This reminds us of Sadrā’s interpretation that the entities in the world are suspended identities and their existences are, apparently, identical with their very suspension. If they are deprived of this connection, even for a moment, they will lose their existence. Sadrā refers to a Quranic verse in this regard: “God is engaged with a task every day, and this constant and daily engagement of God means that He is, actually, invariably all-potent.”

2. 2. The Resurrection (al-ma'ad)

The world is, surely, moving towards a destination. This, undoubtedly, stems from the principles of the trans-substantial motion and is needless of any reasoning or demonstration. A motion lacks any meaning unless it has a destination. However, it could not be claimed that all the details of the issue of resurrection as have been set forth by different religions, namely Islam, may be explained or interpreted through the doctrine of the trans-substantial motion. Rather, the point is that the world is inwardly moving towards a destination that could only be reached in a world other than this world, since the world, owing to its ontological inferiority in comparison to man, cannot help him to obtain his goal. Hence, the world as a whole in its continuous and eternal motion goes towards maturation and perfection and this maturation is indeed the very resurrection itself. (Sadrā, 1990: vol.9, 159; Surush, 1978: 69).

The study of Sadrā's ideas shows that no philosopher has ever deliberated upon the next world and resurrection more than he has. He has clearly acknowledged and demonstrated the bodily resurrection. (Sadrā, 1896: 384). He has, however, emphasized that individuals would have subtle bodies after death. Hence, they are not bodiless souls after death but have certain bodies whose texture is of the acts they have done in this world. Mullā Sadrā, in the 4th volume of *al-Asfār* and his other works, namely, *al-Mabda, wa'l ma'ad*, and *al-Shawāhid al-rubūbiyyah* examines the issue of resurrection and devotes independent treatises such as *al-Ḥashr (risalah fi)* to this subject.

2. 3. Solving the Problem of Origination (hudūth) and Eternity (qidam)

The theologians (*mutakallimūn*) and philosophers are in disagreement over the question of the world's having a temporal origin. That is, if we go back, will we arrive at a point in time at which the world originated, or, the further we go, will there still be the world and time? A group of the theologians regard the world to be temporally contingent, whereas many philosophers consider it to be temporally eternal. Kant, however, believes this problem to be of a contradictory and unsolvable nature.

Nevertheless, based on the trans-substantial motion, it can be concluded that there is no time beyond the world so that the world could be called "temporally eternal". In case someone like Newton considers time to be an absolute and independent entity, the term "temporally eternal" will be meaningful. However, if time is created by the world itself, and the world of matter is the product of the motion of the very quiddity of being, the issue of the eternity and temporality of the world will be meaningless. And since the quiddity and substance of the world are totally in motion, and motion obviously becomes existent in every moment, calling such an existent as eternal is absolutely meaningless. (Sadrā, 1990: vol.3, 141; Ashtiyani, 1977: 58).

2. 4. The Relation of the Changing (mutaghayyir) to the Permanent (thābit)

The relation between the changing and moving existents and the permanent and unmoving existents, as well as the connection between the contingent (*ḥādith*) existents and the Necessary being (*wājib al-wujūd*) Who is essentially eternal in a manner that they are not followed by the bond of infinite regression and the passivity of the Necessary Quiddity, are among the significant issues occupying the minds of the philosophers. The reason is that on the one hand, the changing effect requires a changing cause, and on the other hand, the cause and the maker of the entire changes is God Who is unchangeable. Such an issue is called a real paradox by modern philosophers.

Mullā Sadrā, however, solves this complicated problem in the light of his doctrine of trans-substantial motion. He says: "When we say that the changing and contingent effect requires a changing and contingent cause, this is only applicable to existents that origination (*ḥudūth*) and change are added to their quiddity from the outside. Regarding this Kind of existents, the cause has two responsibilities: first, the creation of the thing itself, and second, the production of the change and motion in it. Nevertheless, the dependence of existents that are essentially flux and their identity is

identical with their becoming upon a cause is a simple (*basit*) rather than a compound necessity, that is, their creation is identical with their becoming. And for the cause, their creation is identical with the bestowal of motion upon them.

Hence, an existent that owns a changing identity and is dependent from an ontological point of view relies upon its own cause, and what he receives from the cause is indeed the same existence (*basti*) of the cause. That is, the creator does not grant him the change; rather, He gives himself to him. Hence, this creature is related to the Creator with respect to the unchanging aspect of his identity. However, this entity whose relation to God bears the relation of constancy, is, itself, identical with change and flux, that is why an existent that is unchanging from one aspect and changing from the other becomes the source of change in the world. (Sadrā, 1990: vol.3, 68).

2. 5. The Soul & its Union with the Body

The explanation and justification of the ontological worlds of man, including the worlds of sense perception, imagination, intellect, the changes of the soul from one stage to another, as well as the manner of the union of the soul with the body, and the intensity of the connection of these two in the superior levels of perfection, and their unity in the intellectual being are merely feasible in the light of trans-substantial motion. (Ibid: vol.9, 85 & 96- 98).

There are different opinions concerning the origination (*hudūth*) and eternity (*qidam*) of the soul. Some philosophers believe in origination; whereas others acknowledge the eternity of the soul. The followers of the theory of origination, however, have different views concerning its quality. In general, there are three important viewpoints in this regard: the creation of the soul along with the creation of the body; the creation of the soul through the creation of the body; and the creation of the soul before the creation of the body. There are, also, different viewpoints concerning the theory of the eternity of the soul as to whether it is in the horizontal or vertical chain, or whether it is essential or temporal. (Ibid: vol.8, 330).

Mullā Sadrā believes that the soul is created with the body but it becomes immortal and spiritual through the spirit. In his view, the soul is the product of the body's trans-substantial motion. Body is the background and potency in relation to the soul and provides the proper conditions for its appearance. The soul, however, in his subsistence and continuity does not need any material predicate. Therefore, the principle of trans-substantial motion indicates that although man has two dimensions, material and spiritual, and spiritual dimension is prior to the material, but the material world is only background of his growth and only way for passing to the spiritual world; it shows that the material world is prior to the spiritual world from view of temporal and linear. And because man is a being who moves towards spiritual perfection, this perfection is possible only in corporeal world only on the basis of the trans-substantial motion.

Concerning the soul-body relation, Sadrā argues that: "The state of the soul in the time of origination (*hudūth*) is not similar to its state after achieving perfection and attaining the source of actualization. The reason is that the soul is corporeal in its origination, whereas its subsistence is spiritual. It is like a baby whose life is based on the womb before its birth, whereas when his being changes, he will be independent. It is also like the need for a trap to hunt the prey. However, after the hunt is over, there is no need to the trap any more. In other words, the elimination of the womb and the trap is not in contradiction with the subsistence of the baby or the prey". (Ibid: vol.9, 393).

One of the significant conclusions of Sadrā's theory on the soul is the nullification of the idea of transmigration. The proponents of this idea believe that the soul might leave the body of a person after his death and join the body of another. However, according to the theory of the trans-substantial motion, since the soul is the continuation of the physical movement of a body and absolutely belongs to it, its attachment to the body of someone else is fundamentally irrational.

In the trans-substantial motion, each body seeks a soul, which is appropriate for it. This soul is nothing in the beginning (Ibid: 328), but grows gradually along with the body and develops actuality and form. In this way, how could it be possible for a body to accept and accompany a soul, which has been formed and grown in accordance to another body?

2. 6. The Union of the Intellect & the Intelligible (*ittiḥād al-‘āqil wa’l-ma’qūl*)

This problem is among the most significant philosophical issues over which there has been a lot of dispute and controversy among philosophers. This issue has attracted the attention of philosophers in two respects: first, mental existence and second, the knowledge of God as to the objects and creatures that are subject to change. Porphyry for the first time used this term in a general and non-demonstrative sense but Ibn-Sīnā blamed him for holding this view and writing a book on this subject. (Ibn Sīnā, 1996: vol.3, 295).

Mullā Sadrā, however, considers the issue of the union of the Intellect and the Intelligible to be among the most difficult philosophical problems that he has dealt with through supplication to God like many of his other philosophical beliefs and has interpreted it as the Divine bounty and effusion. (Sadrā,1990: vol.3, 312 & 335-353).

In any intellection, the presence of three things is rationally necessary: the perceiver, the perceived and the perception. If these three concepts have three different referents in the external world as well, no unity will take place between the intellect and the intelligible. Thus, unity means that these three concepts have one common referent in the external world and that referent is the Intellect, Intelligible and intellection at the same time, The difference among them is merely mentally-positated (*i’tibārī*).

The idea of the Intellect and the Intelligible with regard to the knowledge of the self has been propounded before Mullā Sadrā. Ibn Sīnā in the book of *Alshifa*, by reference to doubt of lack of permanence subject while occurrence motion in substance, clearly denied trans-substantial motion, In fact, in his thought for occurrence motion in substance must be permanent thing until motion occurs in its attributes (Ibn Sīnā, 1997: 187-191). But Mullā Sadrā thinks that because motion of a thing is the same as its existence, then motion in substance of a thing doesn’t need external subject. Since anything itself is another thing in last and later moment, and also mover, in this motion, is like moving and is not other identity for it. Consequently we can say, trans-substantial motion indicates property of a thing existence which is flux and mobile, and it is also a rank of ranks of existential reality. Because reality of existence has two ranks, the first is rank of fixed and permanence existence, the second is rank of flux and mobile existence, that motion is a property of flux existence and it is necessary and indispensable and inseparable of it. While, motion in accidents such as quantity, quality and so on are non-essential, and have fixed subject, that motions happen on it, like change of things color or change of their position or change of parts of a set towards each other. Sadrā presents several arguments for demonstrating the trans-substantial motion, he shows this subjects, by making uses of motion in accidents and also to survey the nature of time. In mulla sadra’s view accident existence, is not independent and itself existence, but accident is a rank of substance existence ranks because accidents don’t have any essential independence for themselves, and they only indicate dignity of itself substance existential (Sadrā, 1990: Vol.3, 86-87).

Even Ibn-Sīnā who regarded the unity of the Intellect and the Intelligible as an irrational idea, accepted it with respect to the knowledge of the self (*ilm al-nafs*). However, the subject under discussion is the union of the Intellect and the Intelligible concerning the knowledge of other than the self. Here, one of the most epistemological principles of the Transcendent Theosophy (*al-hikmat al-muta ‘aliyah*) is formed. Mullā Sadrā demonstrates the union of the Intellect and the Intelligible through the unity of being (*wahdat al-wujūd*) and the trans-substantial motion (*al-ḥarakat al-jamhariyyah*). He not only generalizes this theory to the knowledge of the self, but also to the knowledge of other than the self. He also demonstrates it not only at the level of intellection but also at the level of imagination and sensation. (Ibid: 175).

The union that Mullā Sadrā demonstrates between the knower (*‘ālim*) and the known (*ma’lūm*) in the acquired knowledge is not the union of two quiddities (*al-māhiyyah*) since it is impossible that during the perception of something (e.g., a cypress tree), the quiddity of the intellect (e.g., man) becomes identical with the quiddity of the accidental or essential intelligible (e.g., the cypress tree). Also, the union of existence (*wujūd*) and quiddity is totally impossible, e.g., the existence of man is not unified with the quiddity of the tree or vice versa. Moreover, unity in actual existence is not

possible either (e.g., the union of the intelligent essential existence and the accidental intelligible). The purpose of the union is, rather, the union of the intelligent existence and the essential intelligible. On the other hand, the union of two beings is only possible in two ways: the union of the accident (*'araḍ*) and substance (*jawhar*) or the union of the matter and form.

The union of the accident and substance is such that any of them is other than the other in its quiddity. The accident is not substance in its quiddity, while substance is not accident either. They are, however, united as to external existence, that is, the accident is among the stages of the being of the substance and has no entity independent of it. A substance which receives the accident does not change (just like an object whose length or volume is increased). Nevertheless, in the union of the matter and form, the matter changes with receiving each form and there would be a distinction between that form and the other (e.g., a sperm that is transformed into a fetus).

The opponents of the theory of the union of the Intellect and the Intelligible agree with the first assumption (the union of the accident and substance) and believe that the soul is a substance with an independent being while the perceptive forms are accidents that enter the domain of the soul. However, this domain does not change by the coincidence of images. According to this view, the substance of the souls of Prophets is similar to that of the ordinary people and there is no intensity and development in the soul. They are only independent images and the existing differences are related to some states and accidents.

The proponents of the idea of the union of the Intellect and the Intelligible acknowledge the second assumption (the union of the matter and form). (Ibid: vol.5, 282-283) with respect to the soul and perceptive forms. That is, the soul is a matter that changes by receiving the perceptive forms in a manner that the being of the soul is united with the same form it conceives. According to this view, at any stage of developmental perception, a substance appears in the soul. On the other hand, the soul with any scientific form transforms potency into actuality. During this change, a thing becomes a different thing due to substantial becoming without any changes in its unity and individuation.

Thus, the substances of the souls of perfect men and Prophets are not only different from ordinary people but also at any stage of perception, the substance of the soul of the perceiver will be different from the former stage, despite the stability of its unity and individuation.

In *al-Asfār*, Mullā Sadrā has demonstrated the union of the Intellect and the Intelligible on the basis of four reasons. One of these demonstrative reasons that is well known as the mutual correlation reasoning (*burhān- itaḍayyif*) is used to prove unity in absolute perception. This reasoning may be explained in the following way:

The intellectuality and intelligibility are correlated and the Intelligible is what is essentially Intelligible regardless of what is other than God. Such an Intelligible should be Intellect itself, since if it is not Intellect in its own quiddity, its Intellect is another one and it is Intelligible with respect to another Intelligible rather than in its own quiddity. However, it is assumed that the Intelligible by essence is Intelligible regardless of the other (*ghayr*). It should, therefore, be its own Intellect.

Regarding the principle of the union of the Intellect and the Intelligible, (*ittiḥād al-'āqil wa'l-ma'qūl*) Mullā Sadrā states, "I was writing in Kahak, near the city of Qum, I was going to Qum to visit the holy shrine of the daughter of Imām Ja'far ('a). It was Friday when I obtained the due preparedness. Thus, this was revealed to me through the Divine Aid (Al-Qummi, 1994: Vol.1, 17)." He also stipulated that the Divine secrets cannot be revealed through theological discussions and dialectical opinions, and the only approach to attain this kind of knowledge is exclusively the demonstrative and intuitive approach. (Sadrā, 1990: vol.1, 361)

Concluding Remarks

The doctrine of the trans-substantial motion is rightly a comprehensive doctrine which interprets the issues related to physics and metaphysics, the Invisible (*ghayb*) and visible (*shubūh*), the origin (*mabda'*) and the return (*ma'ād*), the soul and the body, the motion and evolution, and creation and life on the basis of a new outlook and it presents a desirable and natural image of all these issues.

After the introduction of the trans-substantial motion, none of these issues are considered scattered subjects that should be treated separately. Having acknowledged the fundamental principles of the trans-substantial motion, one finds these issues like the product of a fruitful tree, which ripen one after the other and pave the ground for the true confessors of Divine Unity to seek closeness to God. Moreover, they herald the achievement of new things for man every day.

One who does not believe in the trans-substantial motion will never realize his inner transmutation, for being oblivious of the immateriality of the spirit; he has no means to comprehend the mysteries of metaphysics. This is because one who does not know himself is not capable of knowing the outer reality, and one whose trans-substantial evolution is directed towards bestiality, cruelty or malice and not towards becoming an angel, or one whose trans-substantial motion is directed towards becoming an angel but is not able to continue the way and has contented oneself with some of its Levels cannot be a perfect theosophy.

Works Citation

- Akbarian, Reza (1999), *The ontological Explanation of Time in Mullā Sadrā Philosophy*, Islam-West Philosophical Dialogue (The papers presented at the world congress on Mullā Sadrā, Tehran: (SIPRIIn) Publications. p.p 271- 290.
- Ashtiyani, Sayyid Jalāl al-Din (1971), *Sharh-i hal va are'yi Falsafi Mullā Sadrā*, Mashad: Chapkhane-y – Khurasan (An excellent Persian study of life and ideas by Leading recent “traditional” Iranian Philosopher).
- Al-Qummi, Abbas Mohammad Riza (1994), *Safinat al-bihar wa-Madinat al-hikam wa-al-athar*, Qum: Dar al-uswah-lil- Tibā'ah wa-al-Nashr.
- Ibn Sīnā(1985), *al-shifā, al-Tabīyyat*, al-Sam'al-tabī'i, ed, Ibrahim Madkur, Qum: Āyatullāh Mar'ashī Najafi library.
- Ibn Sīnā(1996), *Sharh al-ishārāt wa'L-Tanbihāt* (Remarks and Admonitions: a Philosophical commentary on Avicenna book, by Nasir al-Din al-Tūsī), Qum: Nashr al-Balaghat.
- Ibn Sīnā (1997), *al-shifā*, Qum: Center for Islamic books.
- Sabzevari, Hadī (1993), *Sharh-i Manzumah (A Treatise on Logic in Verse)*, Tehran: Nashre Nab.
- Shīrazī, Sadr al-Din Mohammad, (Mullā Sadrā) (1990), *al-Asfār al-Arba'ah*, Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Ihya al-Thurat al-'Arabi.
- Shīrazī, Sadr al-Din Mohammad, (Mullā Sadrā) (1983), *Asrār al-āyāt* (secrets of the Divine signs), edited by M-Khajavi, Tehran: Institute of cultural studies and Research on the Philosophical hermeneutics of the Qur'an.
- Shīrazī, Sadr al-Din Mohammad, (Mullā Sadrā)(1964), *Al-Masha'ir*, ed/tr.H.Corbin, Tehran: Bibliothēque Iranian (A focused treatise on Mullā Sadrā's ontology).
- Shīrazī, Sadr al-Din Mohammad, (Mullā Sadrā)(1961), *Al-Hikma Al-Arshīyya*, ed/tr. Ghulām āhanī, Isfahan: Isfahan University Press; tr.J.w. Morris (1981), *as the wisdom of the throne*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Shīrazī, Sadr al-Din Mohammad, (Mullā Sadrā)(1896), *Sharh Al-Hidāya of Athīr al-Din Abbarī*, edited by Abdal-Karim Shīrazī, Qum: Intishārāt-i-Bīdar.
- Surush, Abd al-Karim (1978), *Nihād-i Na-aram-i-Jaban*, Tehran: Intishārāt- i- Qalam (A Pioneering study of Mullā Sadrā's concept of substantial Motion by a Philosopher of Science and Prominent dissident Iranian intellectual).
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein (1996), *The Islamic Intellectual Tradition in Prsia*, edited by Mehdi Amin Razavi, New York: Curzon Press.