



A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA USE DURING AND AFTER THE 2019 HONG KONG PROTESTS

M. Logan Musser¹, Dr. W. Patrick Bishop²

^{1,2}University of Tennessee Martin

Abstract

Since the return of Hong Kong to Chinese Rule, it has been a unique region in terms of administration and legal system, embracing some characteristics of former British rule while also edging closer to assimilation with the wider Chinese state and its mandates. This assimilation reached a turning point in 2019 with region-wide protests centered around a proposed move toward an increase in democratic processes in Hong Kong in response to a bill allowing extradition of Hong Kong citizens to the Chinese mainland, a rebuffing of Beijing's control of the area. The protests captured international attention as primarily younger residents of Hong Kong took to the streets in an effort to delegitimize mainland control. Older residents of the city more closely favored the Chinese government and its regulations. Beijing countered the pro-democracy propaganda of protestors with extensive use of the media. Agenda setting theory, the theory of exposure learning, and dependency theory provide the lenses through which the overall success of the Chinese government can be observed and understood. Chinese media outlets framed the issue as one of disorder and linked that disorder to foreign media and foreign governmental intervention. China emphasized security and national sovereignty more explicitly and robustly than demonstrators which lead to an increase in exposure to Beijing's viewpoints over pro-democracy propaganda. These elements were made all the more successful by the dependency of the urbanized and industrialized population of Hong Kong on the media for information and viewpoint dissemination. Dependency theory and its effects during the demonstrations made agenda setting and exposure learning more effective than they would have been alone in setting the tone of the conversation around the future of Hong Kong. Chinese utilization of media techniques and information dissemination ultimately proved successful in promoting Beijing's control of the region which demonstrates the importance of mass media and its reach and effects in urban areas especially.

Keywords

China, Hong Kong, Protests, Communication Theory, Agenda Setting, Dependency, Media, Exposure Learning

Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus disease in late 2019, the pro-democracy protests occurring in Hong Kong were the focus of most international news outlets. In the years since, most outlets have shifted their attention away from Hong Kong, but it is important to analyze what happened in this special region of China, particularly mainland China's use of propaganda as a way to combat the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement and its efficacy.

Context, Ideology, and Purpose of the Propaganda

A British territory from 1842 to 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to Chinese rule, it "became a Special Administrative Region of China with its own "mini constitution," legal system, and some democratic rights like free speech and the freedom of assembly under its Basic Law" (Blakemore, 2019, para. 6). Since then, China has worked to exert more control over the region, with Ngok (2017) writing that "in recent years, with more intervention from Beijing, the China factor as a powerstructural and organisational factor has become increasingly salient in Hong Kong elections, in some cases threatening the electoral integrity of the elections" (p. 17). Ngok (2017) noted that the greatest threat to Hong Kong's limited autonomy was that the Hong Kong people would become used to China's intervention, but this threat was somewhat counterbalanced by ongoing activism such as the 2014 protests (p. 24). Most recently, in March 2019, a series of pro-democracy protests rocked Hong Kong and caught the attention of worldwide news agencies.

A response to a proposed bill that would allow the government to extradite individuals to mainland China, the protests grew from thousands of pro-democracy advocates taking to the streets in March 2019, to involve

marches of millions of supporters by the end of the year (Singh et al., 2020). These protests, although antagonizing mainland China's Beijing government, had overwhelming local support. While these protests did result in the suspension of the bill and victories for pro-democracy candidates in local primary elections (Singh et al., 2020), the movement was interrupted by the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, an event that mainland China used to its advantage to further spread the influence of its propaganda machine.

In response to the Hong Kong protests, the Beijing-based government in mainland China turned its state-funded propaganda efforts toward both local residents in Hong Kong and international audiences. The government's application of propaganda, which often used a mixture of white, gray, and black information, depending on which would best fit the state's narrative at that point in time, was focused on two outcomes: delegitimizing the protests in the eyes of local and international audiences and lessening Hong Kong's resistance to mainland control.

The Propaganda: Beijing's Response to Pro-Democracy Protests

Tam (2020) noted that while the protest was popular among younger members of Hong Kong society, the older generations are "more likely to support the government's tactics" (para. 2). To capitalize on this susceptibility, the government released stories through "traditional media, including television and newspapers, and also on social media outlets such as Weibo, WeChat, Twitter, and YouTube" (Tam, 2020, para. 2).

This propaganda followed a pattern established for decades by the government's state-run media outlets: silence dissenting voices by buying them out, then overwhelm their audiences with "approved" reports from multiple outlets (Lim & Bergin, 2018, para. 35). These outlets were often foreign and "trustworthy" outlets that have no outward connection to the Chinese government, which follows the strategy, made famous by Chairman Mao, of "making the foreign serve China" (Lim & Bergin, 2018, para. 24). In the case of the Hong Kong protests, this maxim was taken to new extremes. Kao and Li (2020), wrote that during the protests, hackers would take control of foreign Twitter accounts and then post pro-government and anti-protest messages, indicating a lack of foreign support for the movement (para. 5). ProPublica reported tracking over 10,000 hacked accounts, many of which mirrored the stolen account of Kalen Keegan:

The new author tweeting as @KalenKayyy had strong views on geopolitics — all aligned with the Chinese Communist Party. It was obsessed with the protests in Hong Kong, offered uncritical praise of the Hong Kong police and accused demonstrators of fomenting a "color revolution" backed by an "anti-Chinese American conspiracy." (Kao & Li, 2020, para. 1-5)

This "foreign" information was paired with local news reports that vilified the protesters and "impl[ie]d that criticism of China is rooted in jealousy or an attempt to curb its attempt to rise" (Tam, 2020, para. 5).

Tam (2020) wrote that, drawing on the attitudes of the older generation of Hong Kong residents who often dismiss foreign reports of Chinese human rights violations as actions of the "conniving West[. . .] state content often blames the younger generation's public anger on foreign agitators seeking to disrupt cohesion" (para. 6). One such news outlet to do so was Wen Wei Po, which often published reports of protests being driven by the foreign



Figure 1

Note. From [Xingji keyi] yang han "laoshi chang chuxian" yi junyong shoushi zhihui, by Wensen, 2019, July 22, Wen Wei Po.

"military officer" seen in Figure 1 (Wensen, 2019, para. 1). This outlet published multiple stories questioning the man's role and noted that unnamed "netizens," or net citizens, questioned whether he represented a foreign power (Wensen, 2019, para. 4) and suggested that by making hand gestures such as "touching his head and tapping his belly button," he was giving the order to shoot or approach (Wensen, 2019, para. 5). Building on reports such as Wensen's, "people in positions of authority in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have attributed the escalating levels of violence to political agitators, some funded by foreign forces, exploiting the naivety of other protesters in order to bring chaos and a break-down of law and order" (Stott et al., 2020, p. 815), a stance which vilifies the protesters and completely ignores the violent and instigative actions of the Hong Kong police and members of the army stationed in the region.

Matters continued to escalate when, in May of 2020, during the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic when most countries and media outlets were focused on domestic issues, the Chinese government released legislation, a national security law, which built on the propaganda that it had spread. Hernández (2020), wrote that “Xinhua, the official news agency, said [. . .] that the new laws would save Hong Kong from the ‘terrorism’ and ‘chaos’ of protesters, who it said were colluding with foreign forces to ‘destroy the mainland’” (para. 2). This announcement was coupled with increased televised nationalism as people were shown “waving the Chinese flag in front of skyscrapers in Hong Kong” (Hernández, 2020, para. 10). With this law resulting in numerous arrests of dissenters and the restrictions from the COVID-19 pandemic, the pro-democracy protests were almost entirely halted. March of 2021 saw yet another piece of propaganda further limit the pro-democracy movement, as “the Hong Kong government said it would introduce a bill requiring district councilors to take loyalty oaths and would ban candidates from standing for office for five years if they were deemed insincere or insufficiently patriotic” (Bradsher et al., 2021, para. 18).



Figure 2

Note. From *Key chains and teddy bears in riot gear: Hong Kong promotes national security* by Wang, 2021, April 15, *New York Times*.

In April 2021, Hong Kong celebrated National Security Education Day, a holiday touting the efficacy and moral superiority of the national security law passed in 2020. This new holiday was “promoted extensively through street-side banners, front-page advertisements in the city’s newspapers, and even a scrolling digital display on one of Hong Kong’s downtown skyscrapers” (Wang, 2021b, para. 5), and was one of the mainland government’s most heavy handed propaganda pushes. Wang (2021b) described the event as a “mixture of cutesy cajolery and overt shows of force” (para. 3) as the Hong Kong Police College sold teddy bears in riot gear with zip ties on their chests, provided grab bags with themed goods (Figure 2), and also

showcased a parade of goose-stepping police marching in formation. Throughout the city, schools hosted flag raising ceremonies and enlisted students in the promotion of national security, with one principal stating that “national security should be incorporated into every part of their curriculum, including geography and biology classes” (Wang, 2021b, para. 19).

The Propagandist and the Target Audience

In the case of the 2019 Hong Kong protests, the main propagandist was the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with the Hong Kong government sometimes acting as their spokesperson. The PRC, or mainland China, is a pseudo-communist nation at odds with the culture of Hong Kong remaining from its British occupancy. Mainland China is ruled by the Communist Party headed by President Xi Jinping, and it has a history of using “propaganda, surveillance, and censorship to monitor and manage popular sentiment” (Weiss & Dafoe, 2019, p. 964). Chen, Su, and Chen (2019) note that China has employed a two-fold strategy of managing sentiment and nationalist ideals with both a top-down control of influencers and a bottom-up approach of increasing nationalism amongst the populace to reinforce the top-down agenda (p. 529).

The propaganda produced during and after the 2019 protests similarly targeted two audiences: influential media outlets and influencers as well as the general population that supported the pro-democracy protesters and would vote in the upcoming elections.

Media Utilization and Special Techniques to Maximize Effect

Throughout the protests, China made extensive use of nearly every media source as a method of spreading their specific messages. Whether it was the use of stolen foreign social media accounts to demoralize protesters or requiring official Hong Kong traditional news outlets like Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) to show programs that undercut the pro-democracy movement, each source was broadcasting some version of message that supported the mainland Chinese government’s role in Hong Kong (Hollingsworth, 2021, para. 45). During the recent National Security Education Day holiday preparations, the propaganda also included in-person speeches, branded children’s

goods, electronic billboard advertisements, and extensive social media advertising from influential Hong Kong residents.

By controlling Hong Kong's long established and, prior to 2019, liberal news media sources such as RTHK, the Chinese government was establishing a local source credibility. Jowett and O'Donnell (2019) wrote that "people have a tendency to look up to authority figures for knowledge and direction. Expert opinion is effective in establishing the legitimacy of change" (p. 276), and China was establishing their propaganda's legitimacy by controlling whether or not traditionally respected sources could contradict it. Similarly, they either controlled the content put forward by opinion leaders or silenced them through their organizations or legal action, such as the recent indictment of journalists who investigated violent counter-protesters.

These actions against both traditional and social media news sources effectively monopolized Hong Kong's communications about the protests, which mirrored China's actions in the mainland where all communications and the use of the internet are controlled by the government. China's efforts to spread their own propagandic message spread their control over Hong Kong, particularly after legislation like the national security law and the more recent laws against journalism were approved.

The National Security Education Day celebrations also utilized two other special techniques: face-to-face contact and visual symbols of power. During the celebrations, which were advertised heavily through traditional and social media, many of the events focused on in-person gatherings such as the main celebration at the Hong Kong Police College. This face-to-face interaction was coupled with the distribution of materials and grab bags that supported the national security law, which undermined the pro-democracy movement, and had to be displayed by the attendees (Figure 2; Wang, 2021b). This exploited the attendees and home viewers' conforming tendencies.

The celebrations also focused on visual symbols of power, such as the police parade, which featured goose-stepping and symbolically raising the Chinese national flag. Wang (2021b) notes that the goose-stepping was impactful because it did not match the Hong Kong police, who had traditionally used a British marching method, as opposed to the goose-step, which was characteristic of the Chinese army. The symbolic flag raising was repeated throughout the entire Special Administration Region, including school events that promoted the national security law.

Applicable Propaganda Theories

Although each individual step of mainland China's propaganda campaign in Hong Kong may have seemed aggressive, the overall strategy employed appeared integrative, which means that it attempted "to render the audience passive, accepting, and nonchallenging" (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2019, p. 17). I argue that this integrative approach was designed around the application of the agenda setting theory, the theory of exposure learning, and dependency theory, with each theory building on the others.

Agenda Setting Theory

Jowett and O'Donnell (2019) defined agenda setting theory as "the ability of the news media to define the significant issues of the day" (p. 171). At the broadest level, this theory claims that while media cannot tell individuals what to think, it can tell them what to think about (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2019, p. 172). According to Chan (2007), the Chinese government has openly been making use of agenda setting theory since 1987, when government officials were told "to exercise firm control over the 'correct' guidance of public opinion, and continuously increase the means to guide the opinion of society" (547). Rather than attempt to impose ideological control on its populace like the party under Mao tried, China has rapidly been moving toward control over the social agenda (Chan, 2007, p. 558).

During the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests, the agenda setting theory was applied through two processes: framing and priming. Framing refers to how important issues are presented, as a change of wording or point of view can "frame" the issue in a different context (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2019, p. 172). The Chinese government framed the pro-democracy movement by not referring to the demonstrations as protests over rights, but instead as acts of "terrorism" or "chaos" (Hernández, 2020, para. 2), and by mentioning each demonstration as an act set opposite acts of nationalism or patriotic symbols. Similarly, the mainland Chinese government primed, or transferred opinions from one topic to a subsequent topic for, media audiences by inundating them with propaganda supposedly from foreign and domestic sources indicating foreign intervention before addressing security concerns (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2019, p. 172). This deflected conversations away from rights and instead focused attention on making Hong Kong more "secure" and "patriotic" (Bradsher et al., 2021, para. 18).

Theory of Exposure Learning

The continuous exposure of the Hong Kong audience to this propaganda served another purpose as well. According to Zajonc's (1968) theory of exposure learning, "mere repeated exposure of an individual to a stimulus object enhances his attitude toward it" (p. 23). The more often an individual is exposed to an idea, the more likely they are to care about it. Jowett and O'Donnell (2019) also wrote that "frequent exposure intensified previous positive and

negative attitudes. This ‘buildup’ of attitude intensity is a factor in the polarization of attitudes with repeated exposure” (p. 163). Lee (2001) found that once individuals were presented with information that matched what they were exposed to, they would act to match that information with their subconscious influences (searching for uncertainty reduction) (p. 1257).

According to Murphy et al. (1995), exposure learning is compounded by elements of the agenda setting such as the use of priming, as the effect is additive, which means that positive connotations in priming adds to positive exposure and negative connotations from priming adds to negative exposure (p. 599). This indicates that the priming efforts that the Chinese government put into their propaganda was an additive influence when combined with the sheer amount of exposure from their propaganda from tens of thousands of hacked foreign Twitter accounts, which artificially altered the trends and conversations that surrounded the Hong Kong protest.

China’s use of the exposure learning theory could also be seen in the efforts taken for National Security Education Day, as information and propaganda about the supposed benefits of the national security law were spread through all aspects of life in the city. From billboards and posters to introducing the concept into every possible class for schoolchildren, it was clear to see that China was counting on exposure to ensure that the populace was encountering their point of view more than the pro-democracy movement’s. As Moreland and Zajonc (1976) found, the context of the exposure does not matter in terms of creating an influence as long as that exposure is there and frequent (p. 175), which matches the push to have national security taught in every “geography and biology class” (Wang, 2021b, para. 19).

Dependency Theory

According to Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976), the dependency theory revolves around an audience’s reliance, or dependence, “on mass media information in urban-industrial societies” (p. 5). Loveless (2008) wrote that “in periods of transition, individuals use more media to search for information; therefore, they become more subject to the effects that the media have been argued to have on audience members” (p. 162). This dependency is further heightened “when a relatively high degree of change *and* conflict is present in a society” (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976, p. 7), a state that could be clearly observed during the pro-democracy protests. The Chinese government in Beijing was rapidly increasing the amount of control that they had over Hong Kong while the conflict came from the multiple demonstrations by protesters and subsequent suppression from said government.

Of particular importance from this theory is the affective effects of dependency. Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur (1976) wrote “that prolonged exposure to violent media content has a ‘numbing’ or desensitizing effect [. . . and] some observers suggest that such effects may promote insensitivity or the lack of a desire to help others when violent encounters are witnessed in real life” (p. 14). This builds upon the additive effect of the agenda setting theory and the theory of exposure learning. The more that protesters and natives were exposed to propaganda that delegitimized the movement and supported the violent suppression of the Hong Kong police and mainland China’s private security forces, the less likely they were to care or join the movement.

Audience Reaction to Techniques and Counterpropaganda



Figure 3

Note. From “Hong Kong’s yellow movement turns Chinese propaganda on its head,” by Prasso, 2020, August 5, *Bloomberg Businessweek*.

Throughout 2019 and the national security law’s crackdown in 2020, members of the general populace continued to quietly protest the mainland government’s influence. This has caused the rise of several forms of counter-propaganda in response to the pro-government propaganda spread by the state media. After the national security law outlawed messages promoting the pro-democracy movement, its supporters began to display vintage pro-China posters, as seen in Figure 3, that advocated the Communist party’s revolution, now repurposed for a new “revolution” (Prasso, 2020, para. 2).

The marches and public demonstrations also continued after the crackdown, despite the increased

danger from participation. Cheung (2021) reported that the largest protest in months occurred on March 1, 2021, as

a Hong Kong court was holding a trial for 47 pro-democracy supporters arrested for involvement in a “massive and well-organized scheme to subvert the Hong Kong government” (para. 3). The defendants were individuals who attempted to use the primary elections to elect pro-democracy candidates and “force the city’s leader to resign [. . .] entirely legal – and not out of the ordinary – in parliamentary systems like the United Kingdom and Australia” (Cheung, 2021, para. 14). Following that trial and the subsequent crackdowns once again, participants in the most recent protests have dwindled even further. Wang (2021a) wrote that one protest held on National Security Education Day, April 15, had only four protesters holding a sign while “they were followed by dozens of police officers” (para. 17).

Instead of acting to further the movement, a large percentage of young residents in Hong Kong reported that they would prefer to simply leave, having lost hope for the region (Teh, 2021). Teh (2021) wrote that nearly 60 percent of people under 30 wanted to leave the city and gave “their optimism about the city’s future an average score of 2.95 out of 10. This was a decrease from 4.37 out of 10 when a similar question was asked in the 2019 poll” (para. 3).

Effects and Evaluation

This leads to one important question: how effective was mainland China’s propaganda? In terms of delegitimizing the protests and lessening Hong Kong’s resistance to mainland control, the propaganda was extremely successful. Although there was some counterpropaganda issued and the protests still continue in some form, the movement lost nearly all of its local support. Regarding passing legislature and aligning the local Hong Kong government with mainland China’s government seat in Beijing, the propaganda campaign was very effective. Shortly after the national security law, which built upon propaganda that vilified the pro-democracy movement as terrorists, was put in place, Beijing postponed the Hong Kong elections and then granted “powers to remove lawmakers from office who do not show clear loyalty to China” (Ramzy, 2020, para. 22). Ramzy (2020), wrote that within minutes of those powers being granted, four pro-democracy lawmakers were removed from office, “prompting the other 15 members of the pro-democracy bloc to resign in protest” (para. 23). On March 11, 2021, the Chinese government made it even more difficult for new pro-democracy lawmakers to be elected to office by passing a bill that “enhances the width and stability of Hong Kong’s democracy by enabling the power of governing Hong Kong to be only held in the hands of the patriots” (Shinkman, 2021, para. 4). This move once again capitalized on nationalist propaganda while removing the “democratic” rights that it espoused.

The Chinese government has continued to pass legislature and enact laws in new, more authoritative ways during April 2021, with very little public backlash, further cementing the efficacy of its propaganda paired with police crackdowns and self-censure. Wang (2021a) wrote that Hong Kong passed a proposal that criminalized the act of casting modified ballots such as writing in candidates and the act of encouraging others to boycott voting (para. 5). The Hong Kong government, with mainland China’s support, also introduced a bill that effectively blocks individuals from being able to leave Hong Kong, an exit ban, which further undermined the desire young Hong Kong residents had to leave the region (Griffiths, 2021, para. 6). Hollingsworth (2021) reported that “press freedom in Hong Kong is dying” (para. 27) as an official conviction has been made for searching for information on anti-democracy counter-protesters who attacked individuals returning from a pro-democracy protest last year. Many of Hong Kong’s once liberal media outlets are either going silent or self-censoring to match the mainland’s official positions (Hollingsworth, 2021).

Through the ongoing silence from the pro-democracy movement, it is clear that China’s tactics proved successful, and with the introduction of national security into every aspect of children’s education, it is possible that this entire movement will be erased with the next generation who will accept mainland China’s influence as natural.

References

- Ball-Rokeach, S.J., & DeFleur, M.L. (1976). A dependency model of mass-media effects. *Communication Research*, 3(1), 3-21.
- Blakemore, E. (2019, August 7). How Hong Kong's complex history explains its current crisis with China. *National Geographic*. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/hong-kong-history-explain-relationship-china>
- Bradsher, K., Wang, V., & Ramzy, A. (2021, March 1). 'Patriots' only: Beijing plans overhaul of Hong Kong's elections. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/world/asia/china-hong-kong-elections.html>
- Chan, A. (2007). Guiding public opinion through social agenda-setting: China's media policy since the 1990s. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 16(53), 547-559. DOI: 10.1080/10670560701562267
- Chen, Z., Su, C. C., & Chen, A. (2019). Top-down or bottom-up? A network agenda-setting study of Chinese nationalism on social media. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 63(3), 512-533. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08838151.2019.1653104>
- Cheung, E. (2021, March 1). Hong Kong protesters come out as 47 pro-democracy figures appear in court. *CNN*. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/01/asia/hong-kong-lawmakers-bail-intl-hnk/index.html>
- Griffiths, J. (2021, April 29). Hong Kong passes new immigration law that could enable China-style exit bans. *CNN*. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/29/china/hong-kong-china-immigration-intl-hnk/index.html>
- Hernández, J.C. (2020, May 23). China deploys propaganda machine to defend move against Hong Kong. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/23/world/asia/china-hong-kong-propaganda.html?auth=linked-google>
- Hollingsworth, J. (2021, April 28). Hong Kong has fined a journalist for ticking a box. That shows the city's media freedoms are in jeopardy. *CNN*. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/28/media/hong-kong-media-bao-choy-intl-hnk/index.html>
- Jowett, G., & O'Donnell, V. (2019). *Propaganda & Persuasion* (7th ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Kao, J., & Li, M.S. (2020, March 26). How China built a Twitter propaganda machine then let it loose on coronavirus. *ProPublica*. <https://www.propublica.org/article/how-china-built-a-twitter-propaganda-machine-then-let-it-loose-on-coronavirus>
- Lee, A. Y. (2001). The mere exposure effect: An uncertainty reduction explanation revisited. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27(10), 1255-1266. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672012710002>
- Lim, L., & Bergin, J. (2018, December 7). Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping>
- Loveless, M. (2008). Media dependency: Mass media as sources of information in the democratizing countries of central and eastern Europe. *Democratization*, 15(1), 162-183. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340701770030>
- Moreland, R. L., & Zajonc, R. B. (1976). A strong test of exposure effects. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 12(2), 170-179. [https://doi.org/10.1016/022-1031\(76\)90068-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/022-1031(76)90068-8)
- Murphy, S.T., Monahan, J.L., & Zajonc, R.B. (1995). Additivity of nonconscious affect: Combined effects of priming and exposure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69(4), 589-602.
- Ngok, M. (2017). The China factor in Hong Kong elections: 1991 to 2016. *China Perspectives*, 3, 17-26.
- Prasso, S. (2020, August 5). Hong Kong's yellow movement turns Chinese propaganda on its head. *Bloomberg Businessweek*. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-05/hong-kong-s-yellow-movement-turns-chinese-propaganda-on-its-head>
- Ramzy, A. (2020, November 30). How the dream of Hong Kong democracy was dimmed. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/world/asia/hong-kong-china-timeline.html>
- Shinkman, P.D. (2021, March 5). 'Attack on political rights': China cracks down on Hong Kong's electoral system. *U.S. News & World Report*. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2021-03-05/attack-on-political-rights-china-cracks-down-on-hong-kongs-electoral-system>
- Singh, K., Jim, C., & Roantree, A.M. (2020, May 30). Timelining: Key dates in Hong Kong's anti-government protests. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-timeline/timeline-key-dates-in-hong-kongs-anti-government-protests-idUSKBN23608O>
- Stott, C., Ho, L., Radburn, M., Chan, Y. T., Kyprianides, A., & Morales, P. S. (2020). Patterns of "disorder" during the 2019 protests in Hong Kong: Policing, social identity, intergroup dynamics, and radicalization. *Policing: A Journal of Policy & Practice*, 14(4), 814-835. <https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paaa073>
- Tam, A. (2020, August 5). Opinion: China's propaganda machine in Hong Kong is setting up a generational battle. *The Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/05/chinas-propaganda-machine-hong-kong-is-setting-up-generational-battle/>

- Teh, C. (2021, April 30). New poll shows 60% of Hong Kong youth aged 15 to 30 want to leave the city if they can. *Business Insider*. <https://www.businessinsider.com/poll-shows-60-percent-hong-kong-youth-want-to-leave-2021-4>
- Wang, V. (2021a, April 13). Election overhaul plan threatens to sideline Hong Kong's opposition. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/world/asia/hong-kong-election-law.html>
- Wang, V. (2021b, April 15). Key chains and teddy bears in riot gear: Hong Kong promotes national security. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/15/world/asia/hong-kong-national-security-education-day.html>
- Weiss, J. C., & Dafoe, A. (2019). Authoritarian audiences, rhetoric, and propaganda in international crises: Evidence from China. *International Studies Quarterly*, 63(4), 963–973. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz059>
- Wensen. (2019, July 22). [Xingji keyi] yang han “laoshi chang chuxian” yi junyong shoushi zhihui. *Wen Wei Po*. <http://paper.wenweipo.com/2019/07/22/HS1907220011.htm>
- Zajonc, R.B. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Monograph Supplement*, 9(2), 1-27.