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AMÉLIE REVISITED: FROM *CAMÉRA-STYLO* TO ARTIFICIAL PEN

Jeroen Gerrits[1]

[1]*Binghamton University*

Abstract

This article places some of the practical impacts of AI on screen writing in a historical context, and draws out some the philosophical implications of the ongoing changes in the medium of film. After offering a historical overview of discourses on screenwriting from the French new wave through the *Cinéma du Look* to the digital turn, it discusses Jean-Pierre Jeunet's 2001 film *Amélie* as a pivot between auteur cinema and generative AI. Analyses of specific scenes from the film will form the basis for the larger claims that when narrative authority shifts agency from *auteur* to machine, cinema's deeply rooted engagement with skeptical issues changes accordingly.

Keywords

Generative AI, screen writing, camera stylo, Amélie, Jeunet, skepticism, Cavell

Introduction

As generative AI continues to make critical inroads into various aspects of the filmmaking industries, this article places some of the practical developments in a historical context and draws out the philosophical implications of the ongoing changes in the medium of film. I will do so by revisiting Jean-Pierre Jeunet's 2001 *Amélie* (original title: *Le fabuleux destin d'Amélie Poulin*). To be sure, this film predates the emergence of artificial intelligence, at least insofar as its impact on cinema is concerned.[i] As the epicenter of a French debate on the impact of computers on cinema during the digital turn, however, *Amélie* serves well as a pivot connecting discourses on screenwriting from the early days of the French New Wave to the impact of AI on screenwriting in our contemporary day and age, culminating in Hollywood's writer's guild strike (2023). Based on this historical context and on an analysis of critical scenes from Jeunet's film, I will make two interrelated claims. I first consider how generative AI reshapes narrative authority and creative expression by shifting agency from *auteur* to machine. I then draw on Stanley Cavell's film-philosophy to argue that the developments in the material conditions of cinema align with distinctions between various kinds of skeptical inquiries. To wit: as cinema turns from analog to digital to AI, the critical questions it provokes tend to shift, respectively, from epistemological skepticism to skepticism of other minds and then to skepticism about the self.

The Return of Writing

To explain my reason for (re-)turning to *Amélie*, we indeed need to go further back into the history of French cinema, to the emergence of the French New Wave in the late 1950s, when François Truffaut and fellow 'young Turks' of the *nouvelle vague* embraced Alexandre Astruc's idea that writing in cinema is to be done with the camera during the filmmaking process.[ii] They thus objected to the idea that film is a mere illustration of prewritten scripts, and were highly critical of films in what the French refer to as "The Tradition of Quality," which relied for their artistic aspirations on adapting well-established works of *literary* authors. Not that the new wave filmmakers would forego narrative altogether—Truffaut himself made some very fine adaptations for that matter—but the *récit* (plot) was not considered as critical for their aesthetic ambitions as the audiovisual aspects of their films. What mattered to new wave filmmakers, who referred to themselves as *auteurs*, was the development of a signature style derived from the way the camera confronted the real world. Astruc's term *caméra-stylo* (literally translated as

camera-*pen*, but also carrying connotations of *style*) applies to a style of filmmaking derived from this confrontation.

Later, in the 1980s, Serge Daney, then chief editor of the *Cahiers du Cinéma* (the film magazine closely associated with the *nouvelle vague*) reemphasized the critical significance of the camera's relation to reality (which, he insisted, is nevertheless not simply represented), declaring it the *Cahiers' axiom*.[iii] The axiom was meant to push back against a new generation of French filmmakers rising to prominence in 1980s and 1990s—Luc Besson, Jean-Jacques Beineix, and Leos Carax, among others—who are collectively known under the franglais denominator *Cinéma du Look*. Daney himself took aim at *L'amant* (*The Lover*, 1992), Jean-Jacques Annaud's adaptation of Marguerite Duras' 1984 novel of the same name, which he rejected precisely for offering a glossy illustration of a pre-existing story. For Daney, Annaud was "the first non-cinephile robot in the history of cinema" who thought of cinema as a "way of telling a story in pictures" so as to provide "a summary of human feelings and human behavior." (Daney 1992, 14). What characterized the new wave cinema, in Daney's words, is that it "communicates itself from one frame to the next, one image to the next, one moment to the next, one shot to the next, and that these all end up constituting a logical and entangled fabric, full of twisted threads." In *The Lover*, by contrast, "there is no communication because everything is communicated" (ibid.). Here, Daney argues, every image amounts to an item from a script, a cliché, an advertisement, a cry for recognition, and all relevant communication between them is predetermined on the storyboard—before any camera confronts the real. Reality, in short, no longer offers any friction to preconceived ideas.

Serge Daney died shortly before his essay on *The Lover* was published in 1992, hence a decade before his discontent would come to a head in the controversy around Jeunet's *Amélie* (2001), a film Jeunet not only directed but also wrote (in line with the auteur tradition), along with screenwriter Guillaume Laurant. As Dudley Andrew has argued, this film, with its "overconfident discourse of the digital," formed the culmination of the type of visual confection Daney had condemned so vehemently (Andrew 2010, 5). Indeed, to create the film's picture postcard version of Paris, Jeunet not only had trash, cars, and graffiti physically removed from the Parisian streets before sending out his camera crew; he also, more pertinently, used extensive postproduction to digitally paintbrush the neighborhoods of Montmartre in romantic hues and to clean up any remaining traces of audio-visual noise. Critics in France —Serge Kaganski and Philippe Lançon up front—were quick to object that digital image scrubbing did not stop short from erasing signs of cultural and racial diversity, of poverty, and of crime as well. They denounced *Amélie* as a digitally cleansed fantasy of the extreme right.[iv]

But this digital purification is only part of the reason why *Amélie*—a major box office success adored by millions of fans[v]—made so many critics uncomfortable. What bothered many of them as well is that, as the flipside of the waning friction of reality and reduced role of the camera-stylo, screenwriting had returned as the more significant aspect of filmmaking. In bringing the script to the screen, *Amélie* spells out all there is to be seen and understood, leaving little room on part of the spectator to discover things for themselves or to foster meaningful connections within the *entangled fabric, full of twisted threads*, as Daney had it.[vi] Thus, Jean-Michel Frodon, who was soon to become the *Cahiers* new chief editor at the time, said that when he first saw the film in the theater, "I was literally oppressed, suffocated by what I felt, and I still think it's a terrible act against the liberty of mind. Around me, people seemed so happy" (Daly and Frodon, n.d.). If Annaud was the first non-cinephile robot in the history of cinema, as Daney had is, Jeunet could perhaps be called the first one to envision a film produced with Artificial Intelligence by prompting characters and viewers alike what to think, see, feel, and do. Indeed, the idea that individuals may be under threat of ceding or losing their agency, or, indeed, of knowing who they are, lies at the heart of the film itself, as I discuss in the next section.

"Now He has Understood": *Amélie* Scene Analysis[vii]

Since the return of writing in the age of computer-generated images and generative AI is at stake, let's look at a brief (AI-generated) description of *Amélie's* plot:

> Amélie *is a whimsical romantic comedy about a shy, imaginative Parisian waitress who decides to secretly perform acts of kindness for others to bring them joy. After finding a hidden box of childhood treasures, she begins a quest to return it and, in the process, engineers small moments of joy for those around her. While helping others, Amélie also navigates her own loneliness and isolation, eventually encountering a handsome stranger and finding the courage to pursue her own happiness.*[viii]

Like many other, very similar descriptions on and beyond the web, this one points at a tension at the core of the film, best captured, perhaps, in the phrase "engineers small moments of joy." We do not, I dare say, like to think of such moments of intimacy as being staged for us by others, much less as being *engineered* by them. Some critics have challenged the idea that Amélie's "acts of kindness" are indeed all that benevolent. Others have interpreted the "small moments of joy" as *surface effects* (Andrew 2010); as underscoring what Daney used to call

the rancid—a set of stereotypically "French" cultural and moral values; or as expressions of what the French sociologist Gérard Mermet called *le pétisme*—a response to "everything that is gigantic or growing, that is, globalization, crime, ordinary violence, unemployment, and the loss of individual identity in the technological age" (Scatton-Tessier 2004, 197). While this latter point about identity loss is indeed relevant to my argument, what matters most to me about the plot description is the claim that Amélie finds "the courage to pursue her own happiness." Indeed, I would rather argue that opposite is the case. While Amélie ultimately succeeds in *achieving* happiness, she does so in spite of failing to find the courage to pursue it on her own terms. That is, despite her growing power over others, whom she entangles in fictions of her making, Amélie fails, in hiding from others, to emerge from behind herself, to author and direct her own life. This becomes evident in two back-to-back scenes that occur roughly two-thirds into the movie. Let me provide some narrative context before describing and discussing these.

As ChatGPT described, Amélie (Audrey Tatou) has fallen in love with a "handsome stranger" named Nino (Matthieu Kassovitz), whom she pursues, even as he is in pursuit of a "mystery man" whose torn-up photographs Nino keeps finding around the photobooths in the subway and train stations in Paris. Amélie is quick to discover that this mystery man is in fact the photobooth repairman—the allegorical film-maker/technician—and she concocts an elaborate plan to 'help' Nino find that out 'for himself,' with the aim of revealing herself to him in the process. Amélie has been developing an increasingly complex script so as to keep Nino captivated in an elaborate scavenger hunt, all the while concealing her identity from him by hiding or masking herself (dressed up as Zorro, for example). The first scene singled out for discussion unfolds when she has directed him to the café where works as a waitress.

Having entered the café, Nino takes a seat in a booth backed by a glass plane and orders a coffee while awaiting Amélie's move. Since he doesn't know what Amélie looks like and is expecting to meet a fellow customer, Amélie is effectively hiding behind herself as the waitress she is, under cover in plain sight, so to speak. She in fact stands right behind Nino, shielded only by the transparent screen. When Nino, sensing her presence, turns around to look at her, Amélie attempts to hide away by turning the screen into a writing surface: she quickly pens "today's menu" on the glass plane (in reverse, for him to read). As Nino returns his attention to his coffee and the point of view switches to Amélie's, we hear her mind's voice (for the first and only time during this film) say: "Now he has understood." Her voice-over continues to predict, or prompt, his every action, followed by the camera showing the described action in slow-motion and extreme close-up: "He's going to put down his spoon, dip his finger in the sugar, turn around slowly and speak to me." Amélie continues to write down the menu as Nino turns around slowly and knocks on the plane. Looking straight through the text while pointing at the Zorro-picture he holds up to her, he speaks to her, asking: "Is this you?" Nino insists when Amélie initially shakes her head in denial: "Yes it's you" (*C'est vous ça*). With a shrug of the shoulders, Amélie turns away from the screen and scribbles a next clue for the scavenger hunt on a note, which one of her colleagues slips into Nino's pocket on her behalf. Nino in turn simply finishes his coffee, pays Amélie's colleague, and leaves the café. Amélie expresses her relief at having so narrowly—and quite incredibly—escaped a direct confrontation with the object of her love by splashing onto the tiled floor as she literally 'melts' into a pool of water.

At one level, this scene illustrates the idea of a film as a mere illustration of a script. Not only does it foreground the act of writing on the allegorical film screen itself, it also has the camera show in close-up what the disembodied voice had just described. The voice prompts, dictates, controls Nino's every thought and movement, thus performing, in a sense, what Frodon had called a "terrible act against the liberty of mind." At the same time, it is at the precise moment when she appears to have gained total control over his mind, at the exact moment that "he has understood" and insists that "this is you," that he drops the entire conversation and walks away. It is possible, of course, that Amélie (whose thoughts must have become inaccessible to us) prompted him to leave, perhaps because her imminent self-revelation frightened her. It is equally possible that he left because her spell over him was broken, or because the spell wasn't hers in the first place. We are left with guesses, as the fact remains that we cannot read her mind any longer (any more than his), and the question lingers whether she can.

While Amélie failed to reveal herself, she succeeded in securing Nino's participation in her scavenger hunt when she delivered the cue for the next (and, as will turn out, final) part of it. It is the turning point at which Amélie lets Nino discover the secret of the "mystery man." As Nino rotates in digital bliss from 'his' discovery, Amélie comes out of hiding to reveal herself to him, only for a luggage train to block her way (and our view). When the train is gone, so is Nino.

One could argue that what the camera reveals, what Nino's mysterious disappearance signifies, is the absence of any reality behind appearances, and ultimately that the film as a whole amounts to a fantasy, as Stephen Mulhall has argued (Mulhall 2008, 115). But importantly, this would not address the fact that Amélie once again utterly failed to reveal herself to the handsome stranger, be he real or phantasmatic. This is all the more significant since it is at this point that she effectively gives up her pursuit of happiness.

In the film's final act, Nino, no longer under her control, returns as miraculously as he disappeared when he knocks on her door of 'his own' volition. Though she initially still avoids him, the two finally unite. Both Nino's return and this final unity are mediated by Amélie's neighbor Dufayel, a "glass man" with a brittle bone disease

who has been duplicating the same painting by Pierre-Auguste Renoir—*The Luncheon of the Boating Party* (*Le déjeuner des canotiers*; Renoir's original is from 1880-1) over and over again with photographic precision for twenty years in a row. Throughout the film, Dufayel has spoon-fed Amélie to generate "her own" narrative around one of the women in the painting, "the girl with the glass," an obvious model for Amélie herself. When Amélie initially fails to respond to Nino's return at her doorstep, Dufayel intervenes by speaking to Amélie through a video-recording displayed on her TV screen as though he were addressing her in person and in real time. Apparently in the know about what happened just seconds ago at Amélie's door, he warns her not to let "this chance" go by. Amélie, taking his words to heart, rushes out after Nino only to rush into him right at her doorstep, thus finally emerging from behind herself and embracing the reality of her returned ("repressed") fantasy.

The film's happy ending (a montage sequence of the two lovers joyfully cruising the streets of Paris on a moped) only deepens the irony that Amélie and Nino found one another by way of manipulations beyond their control. *Amélie* thus leaves the eerie impression that neither of the lovers was the author of their own destiny, and that Amélie in particular only found happiness when she stopped pursuing it, when she stopped authoring the lives of others. Indeed, the film suggests that the narration of her own life had been "engineered" all along.

Varieties of Skepticism

As the camera becomes relatively less important with the digital turn, the friction of images gives way to increased control over them, as well as to a growing impact of screenwriting (plotting). Both these tendencies, the latter in particular, are accelerating exponentially since the emergence of generative AI in 2023. While generative AI is rarely used to produce scripts or films in its own right or as a substitute for human authorship altogether, the technology has quicky become widely used as a collaborative partner or creative assistant in screenwriting, for prompt engineering specific plot twists, for example (Turina 2025; Vainikka et al. 2025).[ix] Still, such human-machine interactions challenge traditional assumptions about agency, authorship, and creativity, especially those upheld by auteur-theory.[x] In line with these changes in the medium, I now postulate that we can expect to see a shift in film's engagement with skepticism. As cinema turns from analog to digital to AI, the critical questions it provokes will shift, respectively, from epistemological skepticism to skepticism of other minds and then to skepticism of the self.[xi]

In *The World Viewed*: *Reflections on the Ontology of Film* (1971; expanded 1979), Stanely Cavell laid out his well-known argument that, as a medium, film is intrinsically bound up with the problem of skepticism. This is not, as one might expect, because he thought that film never has anything to do with reality at all; that, Cavell countered, would in fact amount to a "fake" or "farce" of skepticism (Cavell 1979, 188). On the contrary, film is a "moving image of skepticism," precisely because "not only is there a reasonable possibility, it is a fact that here our normal senses are satisfied of reality while reality does not exist—even, alarmingly, *because* it does not exist, because viewing it is all it takes (ibid. 188-89). More bluntly put, film is a moving image of skepticism because the screen forms an absolute barrier separating the viewer from the world viewed—it screens the world from us. It thus pushes the problem of skepticism to a radical form. For Cavell, the problem is not that we are never convinced of reality, but that, when pressed upon, we do not know what our conviction is grounded upon. And this pressure points to a certain distance that exists between the world and our knowledge of it, or between other minds and ourselves. In Cavell's view, the challenge in our dealings with skepticism is that we need to acknowledge this distance, without either overcoming it or rendering it absolute: there are other ways of relating to the world (and to one another) than by way of knowledge and ocular verification.[xii] In film, however, these ways are not available to us: our distance from the world *is* absolute, and "viewing is all it takes" to be convinced of its reality. Now, Cavell further argues that individual films that can give specific significance to this problematic indeed offer a *moving* image of skepticism, rather than an image that leaves us unmoved.

Retrospectively—that is, after the digital turn—it is obvious that this argument about the intrinsic connection between film and skepticism (and then especially the premise of our "satisfaction of" reality, our or conviction in it) is premised on film as an analog medium, on its indexical nature, or on what D.N. Rodowick has called film's "automatic analog causation" i.e. "the process of transcription" that produces "an isomorphic record that is indivisible and counterfactually dependent on its source" (Rodowick 2007, 113).[xiii] When the recorded image is no longer by default dependent on its source—when light no longer secures a strong causal link by inscribing itself onto a chemical emulsion on the filmstrip, and the image instead consists of the same zeros and ones as any computer generated product—such conviction is no longer warranted. Consequently, the kind of generalized skepticism Cavell had found farcical may no longer be discarded as such, not, at least, on the same grounds. Under such conditions, D.N. Rodowick and other prominent films-philosophers argued that film's engagement with skepticism shifts. That is: when the existence of the world is not really at stake any longer, the question becomes whether other minds exist (in it). As Rodowick puts it:

> For the highly mutable communities forged by computer-mediated communications, the desire to know the world has lost its provocation and its uncertainty. Rather, one seeks new ways of acknowledging other minds, without knowing whether other selves are behind them. (Rodowick 2007, 175.)

Thomas Elsaesser likewise established that "there is no way back to assuming that 'evidence' can be based on ocular verification ('to see is to know')," only to suggest that, consequently, "intersubjectivity poses special epistemic challenges. Watching characters in the 'new realism' mode is like watching other people have a headache: there is no way I can have positive evidence, other than reading signs for minds" (Elsaesser 2009, 10). For Elsaesser, this shift in skeptical concerns indeed explains the emergence of new kinds of films and film genres in the 21st century, most notably the mind-game film (cf. Elsaesser 2021).

In *Amélie*, questions about the status of and control over images (what, if anything, lies behind appearances?) extend to questions about the control over narratives and its characters (who, if anyone, is in control of events, actions, and especially minds? What or whose mind-games is she, and are we—viewers of *Amélie*—subjected to?). Yet I want to take this a step further. For these questions dovetail in *Amélie* to culminate in questions about the self. I take to heart Rodowick's provocative suggestion, cited above, that, in contemporary film, we may be asked to acknowledge other minds "without knowing whether other selves" exist behind them. While this question may well apply to *Amélie* as well, the even more relevant question that arises here concerns the protagonist's own self, beyond that of others. The more she manipulates others (however benevolently conceived or intended) the less she is capable of emerging from her own isolation. Indeed, we may well wonder—or, what's more, *she* may well wonder—whether there *is* a self behind her digital existence. The distance she creates between herself and others, between herself and the world, ultimately leads to devastating conclusions. When Amélie finally fails to emerge herself, fails to emerge from behind herself, her plotting stops, and the writing is taken over. That the new author, who- or whatever it may be, again seems benevolent, renders it all the more uncanny.

Conclusion

This specific form of uncanniness related to a skepticism about the self—which, to unknown extents, remains unknown, strange, even unavailable to ourselves—strikes me as particularly relevant in the context of generative AI. In a way, this is an extension of a tendency already begun with the digital turn, as my discussion of *Amélie* meant to demonstrate. The digital image promises an increased control over the world, and, perhaps, over other minds. But this goes hand in hand with an increased (if perhaps latent) anxiety about a loss of control over oneself, over one's own mind: we may even doubt whether there is a self behind it at all (as the meltdown image may suggest). It is this latter anxiety (or promise) that AI doubles down on.

I have argued that *Amélie* is also useful as a case study because it relates this anxiety specifically to screenwriting (as her actual writing on the transparent screen is meant to capture allegorically). On the one hand, Jeunet's film is the epitome of the return of screenwriting at the expense of auteur-filmmakers who relied on a *camera-stylo* (hence on reality's friction). On the other hand, the film itself allegorizes the writing process: its protagonist constantly writes scenarios and generates stories for others around her, especially Nino, yet the story of her own life only falls into place when she loses control over it, and others script it for her. Thus, in the two critical plot turns I have described, Amélie's control over Nino reaches a peak—she prompts his minutest action; reveals his mystery—only for him to break away from her spell: first, he simply walks out at the supreme moment in the café; then, right after the revelatory moment in the station, he suddenly disappears altogether. These scenes thus foreground the question who is engineering our moments of joy or relief; who is in control, not just of other minds, but of our own. To be sure, *Amélie* does not directly suggest that there's a machine or artificial form of intelligence behind the wheel, but given that AI is increasingly used in our day and age, not now to write entire scripts (yet), but to design specific plot twists, it seems retrospectively highly relevant that, in the major plot twists in *Amélie*, the writing of the story within the story is taken over from the protagonist just when she thought she was at the peak of her powers.[xiv] Her related inability to reveal herself is a further expression of skepticism.

Stanley Cavell argued about (analog) film that it may not, in general, have taught us to see things in new ways, as much as it has taught us to see what was already true of our condition: that we relate to the world by taking views of it. But apparently this was something we needed to learn, and, as Cavell suggests, film has helped make that condition evident to us, revealed it to us, perhaps even explained it to us. Similarly, I suspect that AI generally, and AI writing for film and TV specifically, will not necessarily change the way we think about the self as much as it can reveal, perhaps explain, latent anxieties we already have about it, about agency, about self-knowledge. And just as specific movies have given significance to film as a moving image of skepticism, questions about the self will be given new significance in films and shows as they increasingly rely on AI writing.

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[i] While the concept of AI and its technological development go back for decades—Nina Beguš points out, for example, that the term artificial intelligence was coined by John McCarthy for a conference he organized at Dartmouth in 1956 (Beguš 2025), and the first screenplay written by a recurrent neural network (RNN), for Oscar Sharp's short film *Sunspring*, was produced in 2016 (Goodwin 2016)—the sudden impact of AI generally, and its actual impact of on filmmaking and screenwriting in particular, did not come about until 2023, when the inception of **generative AI** was embedded in popular applications such as ChatGPT and Microsoft Copilot. For an excellent overview of the impact of AI on screenwriting since 2023, see the Special Issue "Screenwriting and AI: Emerging Theories, Modes and Practices," edited by Romana Turina, in the Journal of Screenwriting 2025-11, Vol.16 (3) Nov 2025.

[ii] Both Astruc's 1948 manifesto "Du Stylo à la caméra et de la caméra au stylo" and Truffaut's 1954 article "Une certaine tendance du cinéma Français" have been reprinted in many books, anthologies, and websites. English translations of both essays can be found, for example, in (Graham et al. 2009) and have been reprinted on newwavefilm.com

[iii] Daney formulated the Cahier's axiom in the essay *"La période non légendaire des 'Cahiers'. (Pour préparer la cinquantième anniversaire)"* (in: Daney 1993). An English translation of the text is available online at https://www.diagonalthoughts.com/?p=1506.

[iv] The participants of the national debate around *Amélie* did not shy away from using strong terms, including Jeunet himself. Responding to an op ed for *Libération* entitled "*Amélie* pas jolie" ("*Amélie* is not pretty"), in which Serge Kaganski claimed that *Amélie* would make a fine promotional film for France's xenophobic extreme right, Jeunet declared that the author was "wallowing in bitterness like a pig in its own shit" (Cf. Bonnaud 2001).

[v] With a gross of $41 million, *Amélie* was the highest-grossing film in France for the year of its release, and with a gross of $33 million it is the highest-grossing French-language film of all time in North America.

[vi] The film itself ironically comments on this aspect when Amélie watches the famous fly scene from Truffaut's *Jules et Jim* in a film theater, claiming that she likes to pay attention to things nobody else notices. The fly, meanwhile, is shown in close up, impossible to miss.

[vii] This section draws on, but also significantly reinterprets my analysis of the film in *Cinematic Skepticism* (Gerrits 2019, 88–105)

[viii] Generated by ChatGPT on October 5, 2025, apparently based primarily on a Facebook posting by 'Red Carpet.'

[ix] *The Last Screenwriter* (2024), promoted as the first-ever feature film "written entirely by ChatGPT-4" (Russo 2025), was a box office and critical failure. Turina points out that "the technology hit a wall in the attempts to gauge the emotional depth that human writers bring to storytelling" and that "AI continues to fail in subtextual characterization, dialogue and imagination" (Turina 2025)

[x] Dennis Tenen has argued that writing generally is never really living up to ideals of original genius anyhow, and is more productively thought of in terms of "distributed agency" (Tenen 2023). This is certainly the case for screenwriting. Traditional ideas of authorship have, of course, also been criticized well ahead of the digital turn and rise of AI, when Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and others declared the 'death of the author' from a post-structural perspective. (Barthes 1977; Foucault 1984)

[xi] The complex difference/relation between epistemological skepticism and skepticism of other minds is the topic of the fourth and final part of *The Claim of Reason*, arguably Cavell's *magnum opus*, and exceeds the scope of this essay. The same is the case for the idea that the self is implied in both forms of skepticism, rather than a separate line of inquiry.

[xii] On the three positions vis-à-vis skepticism (its impetus, conclusion, and overcoming), see my entry "Skepticism" in Marrati's *Understanding Modernism, Understanding Cavell*

[xiii] That *The World Viewed* remains nevertheless highly relevant for contemporary film and media studies is the subject of *Cavell's Ontology of Film* (Gerrits 2026).

[xiv] It's worth noting, as Vainikka et al. do, that computer software programs that do not use or preceded AI already developed commonly used tools for automated story visualization, digital co-writing, and communication platforms that enhance and evaluate script work (Vainikka et al. 2025)