Abstract
This paper first explains the
difference between conceivability and metaphysical possibility from the
perspective of possible worlds. Then, it introduces Saul Kripke’s view on the
metaphysical necessity of identity, contributing to a premise in Descartes’ Conceivability
Argument. Next, this paper interprets the Conceivability Argument. Then, this
paper argues that even if “two things are distinct” is conceivable, we cannot
conclude that their distinction is metaphysically possible, so conceivability
does not entail metaphysical possibility. Thus, the Conceivability Argument is
problematic. This paper also responds to a potential objection that, given
humans have clear and distinct ideas, conceivability will entail metaphysical
possibility.
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IJAHSS by IPRPD is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.