This
manuscript develops an integrated account of the moral status of soldiers in
unjust wars by bringing classical just war theory and virtue ethics into
dialogue with moral psychology and research on moral injury and military
suicide. Building on the Augustinian–Thomistic tradition and Catholic just war
doctrine, it defends the moral independence of jus in bello from jus ad
bellum. It argues that individual combatants may retain moral legitimacy
through discrimination, proportionality, and disciplined restraint even when
the war itself is unjust.
The analysis treats military training as a
potential setting for moral formation, drawing on Aristotelian habituation and
Roy Baumeister’s account of self-regulation. It situates these capacities
within social systems sustained by cohesion, shared identity, and mutual
recognition, drawing on Émile Durkheim’s theory of social integration and James
Coan’s social baseline theory.
Research by Hanne M. Watkins and Geoffrey P.
Goodwin (2020) identifies asymmetries in moral judgment: soldiers fighting for
an unjust cause are judged more harshly despite equivalent conduct. Read
alongside Christa Davis Acampora’s relational account of moral injury, these
findings suggest how conflicting moral interpretations may undermine
recognition and belonging. Research associating separation from military
service with increased suicide risk also directs attention to the transition to
civilian life. These findings are consistent with a role for social and
institutional support, but do not establish its loss as the cause of elevated
risk.
The manuscript introduces the warrior virtue
translation problem, the difficulty of carrying military-formed virtues into
civilian moral settings, and the warrior moral ecosystem model, which describes
moral agency as sustained by institutional practice, social recognition, and
shared meaning. This model treats disruption of a soldier’s moral community as
one possible source of moral injury alongside wrongdoing, betrayal, and trauma.
By distinguishing just cause from just conduct
while situating soldiers within a relational framework, this account defends
combatants’ moral agency and proposes a framework for studying moral injury and
reintegration. It suggests that moral repair should attend to recognition,
accountability, and continuity of moral identity. Its clinical implications
remain proposals for investigation rather than demonstrated treatment effects.
